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ABSTRACT 
  Disgorgement is under threat. In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme 
Court held that disgorgement—a routine remedy that allows the SEC 
to recoup ill-gotten gains from financial wrongdoers—is subject to a 5-
year statute of limitations because it functions as a “penalty.” This 
ruling threatens to upend the traditional conception of disgorgement as 
an ancillary remedy granted by the court’s equity power, because there 
are no penalties at equity. With the possibility that Kokesh’s penalty 
reasoning could be adopted beyond the statute of limitations context, 
the future of disgorgement in federal court is in doubt. 
  This Note proposes a way forward that allows for disgorgement’s 
continued viability. The SEC should moderate its use of disgorgement 
for three reasons: because of a trend of suspicion toward strong 
government enforcement power by the Supreme Court, because it has 
been improperly used punitively, and because the rise of other statutory 
schemes has displaced disgorgement’s original justification. At the 
same time, disgorgement should be saved because of the uncertain 
future of administrative disgorgement proceedings, the intuitive notion 
of recovering money from wrongdoers, and the much-needed ability to 
compensate victims. To save disgorgement, the SEC should limit its use 
only to restoring the status quo of injured investors, thereby ensuring a 
remedial—not penal—purpose. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the 1987 film Wall Street, Gordon Gekko famously proclaims: 
“Greed, for lack of a better word, is good.”1 Even before Gekko 
captured the sentiment of an era, the world of stocks, bonds, and 
trading floors had seized the American public imagination.2 Yet 
American popular culture seemed to be uniquely defined by corporate 
excess during the 1980s,3 from gaudy fashion4 to chillingly satirical 
portrayals in literature.5  
However, if the 1980s appeared to be a boom time for bankers 
culturally, the ensuing decades proved to be a real-world reckoning. 
The name “Enron” has been seared into social consciousness as a 
metonym for scandalous financial fraud since 1997.6 The dot-com 
bubble burst in 2000, devastating the industry.7 More recently, the 2008 
financial crisis, “the Great Recession,” plunged the American 
economy into its most precarious position since the Great Depression.8 
And public approval of the financial industry hit a forty-year low in 
 
 1. WALL STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1987). 
 2. See HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTELBY, THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 
(Dodo Press 2006) (1853) (detailing a Wall Street lawyer’s interactions with his downtrodden and 
depressed clerk). 
 3. See William Taylor, Crime? Greed? Big Ideas? What Were the ‘80s About?, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 32–33 (noting how depictions of corporate greed pervaded the popular 
imagination of Americans in the 1980s). 
 4. See Trend Alert: 1980s Banker’s Shirt, CLOTHES CAPTIONED (Apr. 11, 2014), 
http://www.clothes-captioned.com/trend-alert-1980s-bankers-shirt [https://perma.cc/LLB6-
AP9A] (noting and illustrating the fashion revival of the banker shirt and its contrast collars that 
imply the excess associated with the 1980s). 
 5. See generally BRET EASTON ELLIS, AMERICAN PSYCHO (1991) (offering a vivid 
description of the life and times of a psychopathic stockbroker in Manhattan during the 1980s). 
 6. See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE 
ROOM: THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003) (providing a narrative 
description of how the infamous Enron financial scandal occurred). 
 7. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND 
ITS UNDOING (2004) (attempting to trace the origins of the stock market’s rapid rise and 
calamitous fall in the 1990s). 
 8. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE 
(2011) (narrating the buildup and crash of the American housing bubble in 2008). 
BUTLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018  12:39 PM 
2018] SAVING DISGORGEMENT FROM ITSELF 335 
2011.9 Even nearly ten years after the start of the recession, railing 
against Wall Street remains an effective political move.10  
Set against this backdrop, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) has proven to be one of the most vigorous tamers 
of Wall Street excess. As a protector of the public interest in the world 
of securities, the SEC has been a highly active enforcement body, filing 
754 enforcement actions in 2017.11 But after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kokesh v. SEC,12 the SEC may have lost one of its most 
powerful tools for addressing financial misconduct—disgorgement. 
Disgorgement is “[t]he act of giving up something (such as profits 
illegally obtained) on demand or by legal compulsion.”13 For the SEC, 
this tactic—implemented through a request to the courts—has become 
an indispensable part of its enforcement toolbox. In the 2017 fiscal year 
alone, disgorgement accounted for $2.9 billion of the over $3.7 billion 
that the SEC obtained through its administrative proceedings and 
court judgments.14  
The remedy’s roots can be traced back to the 1971 landmark 
decision SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,15 the first instance in which a 
court authorized disgorgement.16 Federal courts had previously limited 
the SEC largely to the relief authorized by the Securities Act of 193317 
 
 9. See Lindsay A. Owens, 40-year Low in America’s View of Wall Street, CNN (Oct. 7, 2011, 
9:34 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/07/opinion/owens-wall-street-disapproval/index.html 
[https://www.perma.cc/5K6Y-D3G4] (“Animosity toward Wall Street is at its highest level in at 
least 40 years.”). 
 10. See David Weigel, Not Much Unites Democrats and Republicans. Anger at Wall Street 
Does., WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/not-much-unites-
democrats-and-republicans-anger-at-wall-street-does/2016/01/18/265998e8-bdf0-11e5-83d4-
42e3bceea902_story.html?utm_term=.f7aa6f7f62a4 [https://www.perma.cc/UF7C-M927] (“Eight 
years after the start of the Great Recession, and seven years since the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program was implemented, the anger at major financial institutions has only grown—in both 
parties.”). 
 11. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL REPORT: A LOOK 
BACK AT FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 6 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-
2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW9L-56YH] [hereinafter SEC 2017 ENFORCEMENT REPORT]. 
 12. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). 
 13. Disgorgement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 14. SEC 2017 ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 11, at 7. 
 15. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 16. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote Three Notwithstanding: The Future of the 
Disgorgement Penalty in SEC Cases, 56 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 17, 20 (2018) (“There is general 
agreement that the penalty phase of Texas Gulf Sulphur was the first time a court determined 
that the SEC had authority to seek disgorgement of a defendant’s ill-gotten gains.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
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and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;18 that is, the SEC had to rely 
on “an injunction barring future violations of securities laws.”19 
Changing that paradigm, Texas Gulf Sulphur invoked the court’s 
equity power to grant disgorgement as ancillary to the primary relief of 
an injunction: “[T]he SEC may seek other than injunctive relief in 
order to effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 
1934], so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty 
assessment.”20 Disgorgement was thus established by the courts as a 
remedial measure supplemental to an injunction, created explicitly in 
order to “effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 
1934].”21  
Since Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Securities Enforcement Remedies 
and Penny Stock Reform Act of 199022 and section 308 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 200223 have combined to provide the SEC with the ability 
to seek disgorgement through administrative proceedings.24 When 
sought administratively, disgorgement is granted according to a 
statutory imprimatur. However, when the SEC seeks disgorgement in 
federal court, it is ordered through the court’s equity power. 
Accordingly, disgorgement sought by the SEC in federal court exists as 
purely a judicial creation, legitimized by the Second Circuit in 1971.  
Equitable disgorgement has been largely unchallenged since its 
conception.25 Recently, however, the Supreme Court suddenly cast the 
future of the remedy into doubt when it held in Kokesh that 
disgorgement operates as a penalty for the purposes of statute of 
limitations described in 28 U.S.C. § 2462,26 which requires that 
proceedings to initiate certain penalties be “commenced within five 
years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .”27 But the general 
 
 18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78a–78qq. 
 19. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017). 
 20. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7246). 
 24. See infra Part IV.A.  
 25. See James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 131, 
134 (2014) (“Today, the legitimacy of disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions is 
unchallenged.”). 
 26. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1646 (2017). 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012). 
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rule is that “there are no penalties in equity.”28 Kokesh thus raises a 
pressing question: Can disgorgement continue to be granted through 
the equity power of the courts? 
If the Kokesh reasoning is adopted beyond the context of the 
statute of limitations, the answer would be simple: disgorgement 
cannot be granted by the court’s equity power. But, given the lack of 
statutory authorization for equitable disgorgement, its invalidation 
would deprive the SEC of a vitally important enforcement tool. 
Although administrative disgorgement is statutorily authorized, that 
enforcement mechanism may also be in danger, albeit for different 
reasons.29 This Note largely addresses the future of equitable 
disgorgement in federal court, where the SEC brings its most complex 
cases.30 
In light of the threats currently facing disgorgement, this Note 
proposes a new framework to ensure disgorgement’s continued 
viability. Because Kokesh evinced a concern about the remedy’s abuse, 
it is through moderation that the future of disgorgement can be 
ensured. Echoing the warning posed by Kokesh, this Note argues that 
there are three principal reasons why the SEC should rein in its use of 
equitable disgorgement. First, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
trended toward rejecting unbridled government enforcement power, 
like that historically shown by the SEC in disgorgement. Second, 
essentially punitive uses of disgorgement by the SEC have contravened 
equity principles. Third, the original rationale for disgorgement—the 
successful enforcement of federal securities laws—is no longer as 
persuasive given the advent of other statutory schemes and new 
enforcement mechanisms. 
That said, equitable disgorgement is worth saving for several 
reasons: it cannot be entirely effectively replaced by administrative 
disgorgement, it embodies the intuitive notion that wrongdoers should 
 
 28. Samuel Bray, Equity at the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (June 10, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/10/equity-at-the-supreme-
court/?utm_term=.19e10df3a48f [https://www.perma.cc/6RMN-EHWU]. 
 29. See Jonathan H. Adler, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Unconstitutional?, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/12/28/are-the-secs-administrative-law-judges-unconstitutional/?utm_term=
.04e7b3977397 [https://perma.cc/XF2S-2X4D] (discussing the uncertain future of SEC’s 
Administrative Law Judges under the Appointments Clause); see also discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 30. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2015, 10:30 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803 [https://perma.cc/
YF7Y-669U] (“[M]ost of its complicated insider-trading cases have been heard in federal court, 
not by its in-house judges.”). 
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not profit from their wrongdoing, and it fulfills the vital need to 
compensate victims. The SEC should narrow its use of disgorgement 
so that it restores the pre-wrongdoing status quo and compensates 
defrauded investors—nothing more. In this way, disgorgement would 
return to its remedial roots while abandoning its use as a deterrent, and 
thereby no longer act as a penalty under Kokesh’s reasoning. 
Ultimately, the SEC should limit disgorgement in order to save 
disgorgement.  
Part I provides a concise background on the history of the SEC 
and its enforcement power and on the development of ancillary 
equitable remedies. Part II specifically examines disgorgement’s 
origins and its historical development. Part III analyzes Kokesh v. SEC. 
Part IV presents the reasons for scaling back disgorgement, while also 
arguing that disgorgement, ultimately, is worth saving. And finally, 
Part V offers solutions that would save disgorgement from itself. 
I.  BACKGROUND ON SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
The SEC is empowered by a broad mandate to serve as the 
principal civil enforcement body for the securities laws. As the SEC 
fulfills this public mission, its ancillary equitable powers, including 
disgorgement, play a pivotal role. 
A. The Role and Power of the SEC 
Composed of twenty-three offices and five divisions,31 the SEC 
claims a comprehensive mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, 
orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”32 The 
SEC describes the period of its origin as “an era that was ripe for 
reform,”33 framing its roots in conformity with its broad duty. The 
Great Stock Market Crash of 1929 provided the impetus for massive 
renovation of the regulatory framework. That crisis sparked the 
passage of two laws that fundamentally transformed how securities 
were regulated in the United States—the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.34 The Securities Exchange Act of 
 
 31. What We Do, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/8YR5-CUT4]. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
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1934 formally created the Securities and Exchange Commission.35 
According to the SEC, there are “two common-sense notions” that 
underlie the motivation for its founding legislation: “Companies 
publicly offering securities for investment dollars must tell the public 
the truth about their businesses, the securities they are selling, and the 
risks involved in investing,” and “[p]eople who sell and trade 
securities—brokers, dealers, and exchanges—must treat investors 
fairly and honestly, putting investors’ interests first.”36  
A critical part of the SEC’s mission is “interpret[ing] and 
enforc[ing] federal securities laws.”37 Specifically, the SEC’s 
enforcement efforts—investigating and litigating violations—are 
undertaken by the Division of Enforcement, created in 1972.38 Once a 
violation has been found, the SEC can pursue enforcement through the 
federal courts, administrative proceedings, or both. The SEC can also 
simultaneously refer a violation to the Department of Justice for 
criminal prosecution.39 In federal courts, the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, often interpreted together, 
provide the statutory authorization for the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement to enforce these laws: 
Whenever it shall appear to the [Securities Exchange] Commission 
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices 
constituting a violation of any provisions of this chapter, the rules or 
regulations thereunder . . . [the Commission] may in its discretion 
bring an action in the proper district court of the United States, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, or the 
United States courts of any territory or other place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such acts or practices, and 
upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary injunction or 
restraining order shall be granted without bond.40 
 
 35. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012) (“There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange 
Commission . . . to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate.”). 
 36. What We Do, supra note 31. 
 37. Id.  
 38. About the Division of Enforcement, SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 2, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/enforce/Article/enforce-about.html [https://perma.cc/8QQJ-EXQ5].  
 39. See generally Arthur F. Mathews, Litigation and Settlement of SEC Administrative 
Enforcement Proceedings, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 215 (1980) (detailing the development of the 
different methods of enforcement that the SEC may pursue). 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012); see also id. § 77v (providing for jurisdiction over “offenses 
and violations” of, as well as “suits in equity and actions at law brought under,” the Securities Act 
of 1933). 
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Taken together, these two statutes form the basis for the principal 
statutorily authorized relief sought in federal court by the SEC—the 
injunctive action.41 In addition, section 27 of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 provides that federal courts possess “exclusive jurisdiction 
. . . of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder.”42  
B. Ancillary Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions 
Equity jurisdiction allows courts to invoke their equity power, 
which “includes all power necessary to make effective the decree 
rendered by the court.”43 Broadly, equity can be defined as “a set of 
rights, remedies, and procedures available ostensibly to ameliorate 
defects of the common law (such as in the cases of fraud, mistake, and 
forgery) and to enforce equitable instruments that required the 
ongoing supervision of a court (such as trusts and guardianships).”44 
Equity occupies a unique position within the American legal system, 
largely emptied of its historical legal force while still maintaining a 
certain relevance.  
Equity’s lineage can be traced to the dual-track English legal 
system; common law courts and equity courts simply had different 
jurisdictions.45 Importantly, in English courts, equity courts only 
possessed jurisdiction when legal, “common law” courts did not.46 As 
with many other aspects of English common law, the nascent American 
legal system adopted a similar conception of equity. Equity is 
enshrined not only within Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution (“in 
Law and Equity”),47 but also in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (“suits of a 
civil nature at common law or in equity”).48 However, a preference for 
common law is apparent in the Constitution. The Seventh Amendment 
 
 41. See id. § 78u(d). 
 42. Id. § 78aa(a). 
 43. Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1188, 
1189 (1975). 
 44. Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-
Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249, 266 (2010). 
 45. See id. (“In eighteenth century England, equity was available in separate courts with 
equity powers but was not available in the law courts. As a doctrinal matter, a court of equity had 
jurisdiction only when no remedy was available in law, or when the available legal remedy was 
incomplete or inadequate.”). 
 46. Id. 
 47. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 48. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
BUTLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018  12:39 PM 
2018] SAVING DISGORGEMENT FROM ITSELF 341 
guarantees a jury trial at common law, and it “prohibits a federal court 
from hearing a case in equity when the plaintiff has an adequate 
remedy at law.”49 The English preference thus became the American 
preference. Accordingly, equitable remedies exist only where common 
law remedies do not, or cannot, provide full relief.  
In the SEC enforcement context, the equity power of the court 
broadens the scope of permissible relief beyond mere injunctions. 
Equity allows courts to grant other ancillary equitable remedies, most 
notably disgorgement—a principal remedy arising out of the Securities 
Acts.50 That is, equity is invoked to further the enforcement of the Acts 
where legal remedies are not enough. 
The equitable relief granted by a court can take many different 
forms, including “injunction, specific performance, reformation . . . , 
accounting for profits, constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation, 
. . . equitable rescission,”51 and, of course, disgorgement.52 Ancillary 
remedies are “simply means and instruments by which primary rights 
may be more efficiently preserved, protected, and enforced in judicial 
proceedings.”53 Equitable remedies become ancillary equitable 
remedies when they are “aiding or subsidiary and supplemental to 
some principal relief to make the principal relief effective.”54 Viewed 
through a securities enforcement lens, ancillary equitable remedies are 
intended to add to or supplement the principal relief of an injunction 
barring future violations of securities laws.55 
Ancillary equitable relief, like disgorgement, has long been held 
permissible under the 1933 Securities and 1934 Securities Exchange 
Acts. In Los Angeles Trust Deed & Mortgage Exchange v. SEC,56 the 
Ninth Circuit articulated this principle when it stated, in reference to 
the Acts: 
 
 49. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 233 (2018) (citing 
Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106, 110 (1891); Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 271, 278 (1857); Parsons 
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)). 
 50. See Comment, supra note 43, at 1188–89 (“The power of the courts to grant SEC requests 
for relief beyond a simple injunction against further wrongdoing appears well-established.”).  
 51. Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 541–42 
(2016). 
 52. See infra Part II.  
 53. 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 171 (4th ed. 
1918). 
 54. George W. Dent, Jr., Ancillary Relief in Federal Securities Law: A Study in Federal 
Remedies, 67 MINN. L. REV. 865, 867 (1983).  
 55. See infra Part II.A. 
 56. L.A. Trust Deed & Mortgage Exch. v. SEC, 285 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1960). 
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[A]s the Supreme Court has stated with respect to other regulatory 
statutes, . . . the Congress must be taken to have acted cognizant of 
the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of 
statutory purposes. As the Supreme Court long ago recognized, there 
is inherent in the courts of equity a jurisdiction to give effect to the 
policy of the legislature.57  
Building upon the broad historical power of equity, courts have 
thus granted forms of ancillary relief that serve to effectuate the larger 
consumer protection and preventative purposes of the 1933 Securities 
Act and 1934 Securities Exchange Act.58 Accordingly, within the 
securities enforcement context, the courts may invoke—and the SEC 
may seek—the power of equity to fashion ancillary relief in three main 
ways: “(a) the remedying of past abuses through the grant of monetary 
relief; (b) the prevention of future fraud by requiring the adoption of 
special corporate procedures; and (c) the temporary appointment of 
special agents in cases of gross mismanagement requiring unusual 
control or wholesale replacement of existing management.”59  
These three principal categories demonstrate the wide variety of 
equitable relief that the SEC can pursue ancillary to its injunction. 
Within the first category, disgorgement60 and rescission61 are examples 
of remedial monetary relief. The second category includes a company’s 
establishment of special committees or implementation of specific 
preventative policies as set out by the SEC.62 And the third category 
involves the appointment of special agent-receivers who function as 
“officer[s] of the court who stand[] neutral among all parties and whose 
primary function is the protection of the property within [their] control 
from waste or mismanagement.”63 Moreover, the court may order 
independent directors to manage the company in accordance with SEC 
 
 57. Id. at 182. 
 58. See Dent, supra note 54, at 867 (“The SEC and some commentators have found 
justification for [courts granting] ancillary relief in the need to effectuate the purposes of the 
securities laws . . . .”). 
 59. Comment, supra note 43, at 1188 (citations omitted). 
 60. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971) (requiring 
the restitution of profits derived from insider trading). 
 61. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 390 (2d Cir. 1973) 
(recognizing that the SEC “may institute an action for injunctive relief [including restitution]” 
(citing SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1103–04 (2d Cir. 1972)); Tex. Gulf 
Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1309 (“[T]he district court had the power to order the cancellation of the 
option so as to effect the purpose of the [Securities Exchange] Act.”). 
 62. See Comment, supra note 43, at 1196. 
 63. Id. at 1200. 
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discretion,64 or the court may even appoint special counsel with 
oversight and investigatory power.65 In sum, the SEC has the ability to 
request a wide array of specific forms of ancillary equitable relief to 
further the statutory scheme aimed at securities fraud prevention.66 
II.  DISGORGEMENT IN THE SEC ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT 
This Part describes the history, purpose, and operation of 
disgorgement. Part II.A reviews disgorgement’s foundations in the 
landmark Texas Gulf Sulphur decision. Part II.B details the history of 
disgorgement as a remedial and deterrent tool. Part II.C explains the 
procedural requirements of disgorgement. Finally, Part II.D explains 
the SEC’s use of administrative disgorgement. 
A. The Origins of Disgorgement 
Disgorgement serves as an ancillary equitable remedy granted by 
the court in response to violations of federal securities laws. In some 
instances, disgorgement or an analogous remedy is expressly permitted 
by statute. The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act of 1990 provides for disgorgement through SEC 
administrative proceedings,67 while the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 allow for 
clawbacks of executive compensation after financial misconduct.68 
However, no statutory authorization for equitable disgorgement in 
federal court exists.69 Disgorgement, like any other ancillary equitable 
remedy, is thus granted in accordance with a court’s equity power, to 
further the enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.70  
Texas Gulf Sulphur established the modern framework for grants 
of disgorgement as an ancillary equitable remedy. That case marked 
 
 64. Id. at 1204. 
 65. Id. at 1208. 
 66. See Dent, supra note 54, at 867 (“The SEC and some commentators have found 
justification for ancillary relief in the need to effectuate the purposes of the securities laws and in 
the general equity powers of the federal courts, particularly as reflected in precedents involving 
other administrative agencies.”) 
 67. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–2(e) (2012). 
 68. Id. §§ 7243(a) (Sarbanes-Oxley), 78j–4(b) (Dodd-Frank). 
 69. See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 2 (2013) (“Congress has never explicitly included disgorgement among the remedies 
the SEC can seek in federal court.”). 
 70. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a) (Securities Act); 78u(d)(5) (Securities Exchange Act). 
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the first time that disgorgement was pursued by, and granted to, the 
SEC as relief for violations for federal securities laws.71 In Texas Gulf 
Sulphur, the Second Circuit held that “the SEC may seek [remedies] 
other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the 
Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty 
assessment.”72 This holding set forth two important principles: first, 
that disgorgement is within the ancillary equitable powers conferred 
upon the court, and second, that disgorgement cannot serve as a 
penalty.73  
The first principle can be seen in the Second Circuit’s embrace of 
disgorgement as necessary to fully realize a key aim of the Securities 
Acts—the protection of consumers from future wrongdoing.74 That is, 
the court considered disgorgement as an equitable ancillary to the 
primary relief of an injunction, implicitly asserting that the court must 
move beyond merely granting an injunction in order to fully effectuate 
consumer protection. The Texas Gulf Sulphur court reasoned by 
analogy: Just as corporate receivers can be appointed under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 without statutory authorization, 
equitable disgorgement of ill-gotten gains should be allowed as well.75 
Texas Gulf Sulphur also cited as rationale Supreme Court decisions 
granting equitable relief pursuant to other, unrelated statutory 
schemes,76 such as the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,77 the Housing 
and Rent Act of 1947,78 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.79 
Taking an expansive view of its own power, the court stated that it 
 
 71. Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 n.13 (“The SEC first sought and obtained disgorgement in SEC 
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.”). 
 72. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).  
 73. Id.  
 74. See supra Part II.B. 
 75. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1307. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 337 (1960) (holding that “a District 
Court has jurisdiction to order an employer to reimburse employees, unlawfully discharged or 
otherwise discriminated against, for wages lost because of that discharge or discrimination” in 
enforcing the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, c. 676, § 15(a)(3), 52 Stat. 
1060, 1068 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)). 
 78. United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616, 620 (1951) (holding that restitution for rent 
overcharges was permissible under the Housing and Rent Act (citing Housing and Rent Act of 
1947, Pub. L. No. 80-129, ch. 163, § 206(b), 61 Stat. 193, 199–200)). 
 79. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946) (holding that it is within a court’s 
equitable powers to order restitution for rent overcharges under the Emergency Price Control 
Standards Act of 1942 (citing Emergency Price Control Standards Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-
420, ch.26, § 205(e), 56 Stat. 23, 34)). 
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could not “infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose 
to circumscribe the courts’ power to grant appropriate remedies.”80 In 
other words, according to the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, restricting its 
capacity to grant disgorgement would compromise one of the court’s 
most important roles—crafting appropriate relief. 
Texas Gulf Sulphur also set out a second principle of 
disgorgement—it must be remedial rather than penal.81 In rejecting 
arguments from the defendants that disgorgement operates as a 
penalty,82 the court embraced the view that disgorgement is remedial. 
Although it did not use the specific term “disgorgement,” the court 
declared that the relief granted was not penal in nature because 
“[r]estitution of the profits on these transactions merely deprives the 
appellants of the gains of their wrongful conduct.”83 For the Texas Gulf 
Sulphur court, restoring the status quo after a violation of securities 
laws constituted remedial relief, not a punitive measure, and the status 
quo was restored by seizing ill-gotten gains from wrongdoers. 
Accordingly, after Texas Gulf Sulphur, disgorgement was considered 
to be both within the equity power of the court and remedial in 
nature.84 
B. Historical Principles of Disgorgement: Remedial and Deterrent 
Purposes 
Although the Kokesh Court deemed disgorgement to be penal in 
nature for the purposes of statutes of limitations,85 courts historically 
embraced it as remedial after Texas Gulf Sulphur. For example, the 
court in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.,86 delineated the outer 
boundaries of remedial relief. That case involved a fraudulent public 
offering of common stock by the defendants.87 Although the lower 
court allowed the SEC to obtain disgorgement of both the proceeds 
and the profits from the fraudulent stock offering, the Second Circuit 
 
 80. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308 (quoting Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 
375, 391 (1970)). 
 81. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 82. Tex. Gulf Sulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308.  
 83. Id.; see Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 n.14 (noting that courts in the 1970s and 1980s often 
referred disgorgement as restitution, a similar equitable remedy). 
 84. See Ryan, supra note 69, at 3 (“Over time, courts came to accept as a truism the notion 
that disgorgement is inherently an ancillary equitable remedy.” (citations omitted)). 
 85. See supra Part I.  
 86. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 87. Id. at 1094. 
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disagreed, explaining that “ordering the disgorging of profits and 
income earned on the proceeds is in fact a penalty assessment.”88  
The Manor Nursing court reasoned that the disgorgement at issue 
was not remedial because “defendants in private litigation would not 
be required to pay defrauded purchasers the profits on the proceeds.”89 
Rather, public investors bringing suit would only receive the difference 
between what they paid and the value of what they received.90 The 
court held that “the [district] court erred in ordering appellants to 
transfer to the trustee all the profits and income earned on such 
proceeds.”91 That is, the Manor Nursing court considered disgorgement 
remedial only when it took the exact amount the investors paid the 
wrongdoer, and the court considered disgorgement penal when it took 
anything more—including any money the wrongdoer earned because 
of those initial, illicitly gained investments. Manor Nursing accordingly 
represents an instance where a court ensured that disgorgement 
adhered to its remedial roots by not allowing repayment beyond the 
actual amount of ill-gotten gains directly tied to the defendant’s fraud. 
Another example of the courts’ embrace of disgorgement as a 
remedial measure is SEC v. Penn Central Co.92 In that case, the issue 
was whether an SEC disgorgement action was rendered punitive by the 
existence of a parallel private suit to recover damages against securities 
law violators.93 The defendants argued that paying damages to 
defrauded investors and surrendering the same ill-gotten gains to the 
SEC would be duplicative, and thus a penalty.94 The court rejected that 
reasoning, holding instead that the existence of simultaneous SEC and 
private suits “does not make the relief sought any less remedial.”95 The 
court further reinforced the nonpunitive nature of disgorgement by 
explaining that “[p]rivate suits do not necessarily restore the status 
quo,” and thus SEC actions for disgorgement can work to complete the 
recovery of ill-gotten gains.96 To mitigate any punitive duplicative 
effect, the court held that any amount of damages paid in a parallel 
 
 88. Id. at 1104. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1976). 
 93. Id. at 596, 599. 
 94. Id. at 599.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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private suit would reduce the disgorgement amount.97 For the Penn 
Central court, disgorgement exists to ensure “total recovery from the 
wrongdoer,”98 and not to impose a penalty. 
Although not expressly stated in Texas Gulf Sulphur,99 deterrence 
was a central principle of disgorgement doctrine in the years before 
Kokesh. For example, Manor Nursing declared that “[t]he deterrent 
effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if 
securities law violators were not required to disgorge illicit 
profits.”100 Moreover, according to Manor Nursing, the statutory 
scheme mandates that the courts and the SEC ensure that security 
fraud violations do not profit wrongdoers.101 Penn Central echoed this 
principle, declaring that disgorgement “serves to protect the investing 
public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.”102 
Another example is SEC v. Golconda,103 wherein the court rejected an 
argument that an injunction provides enough of a deterrent. The court 
stated that not granting disgorgement “would impair the full impact of 
the deterrent force that is essential if adequate enforcement of the 
Securities Acts is to be achieved.”104 The court in SEC v. First Jersey 
Sec., Inc.,105 went so far as to declare that deterrence is “the primary 
purpose of disgorgement as a remedy for federal securities laws 
violation.”106 And finally, the SEC itself embraced the deterrent 
function of disgorgement in a 2006 report, stating that “the aim of 
disgorgement is to deprive defendants of their ill-gotten gains in order 
to deter future violations.”107 
 
 97. See id. (“To the extent that defendants have made restitution, the amounts paid would 
serve to offset part or all of a judgment for disgorgement. In the event that we deem disgorgement 
appropriate, defendants will have the opportunity to prove that they have already relinquished 
their ill-gotten gains.”). 
 98. Id.  
 99. See supra Part III.A. 
 100. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 101. See id. (“The effective enforcement of federal securities laws requires that the SEC be 
able to make violations unprofitable.”). 
 102. Penn Cent. Co., 425 F. Supp. at 599. 
 103. SEC v. Golconda Mining Co., 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 104. Id. at 259. 
 105. SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 106. Id. at 1475. 
 107. U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE 
SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 19 (2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
sox308creport.pdf [https://perma.cc/95F7-7JBK] [hereinafter 2006 SEC SECTION 308(C) 
REPORT]. 
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C. The Mechanism for Determining Disgorgement  
Federal courts have developed a series of procedural rules for 
granting disgorgement. First, although the SEC usually requests 
disgorgement, it is the district court that ultimately determines the final 
amount.108 Second, disgorgement is limited to funds that are “causally 
related to the wrongdoing.”109 Courts cannot reach profits that were 
obtained through legal means.110 Third, the amount of disgorgement 
sought by the SEC, and thus granted by the district court, “need only 
be a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the 
violation.”111 Fourth, the SEC bears the burden of showing that the 
amount it requested resembles a “reasonable approximation.”112 Once 
the SEC meets that initial burden, the burden then shifts to the 
defendants to prove that the amount is instead unreasonable.113 This 
burden is a weighty one for defendants because courts often err on the 
side of granting a larger amount in disgorgement: “[T]he risk of 
uncertainty should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created 
that uncertainty.”114 Ultimately, the district court enjoys “wide latitude 
in [disgorgement] matters.”115  
Once disgorgement has been ordered, the district court must 
determine how the recouped money is to be distributed.116 Typically, 
the district court orders the defendant to pay the disgorged amount 
into an escrow account overseen by a receiver or trust that “is given the 
task of locating those members of the public who were injured by the 
illegal activity and . . . [the task of] pay[ing] each injured party an 
amount determined by the trustee to be fair and equitable.”117 The 
district court then reviews the disgorgement plan set out by the 
 
 108. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The remedy consists of 
factfinding by a district court to determine the amount of money acquired through wrongdoing—
a process sometimes called ‘accounting’—and an order compelling the wrongdoer to pay that 
amount plus interest to the court.”). 
 109. SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 1232. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 116. See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Once the profits have 
been disgorged, it remains within the court’s discretion to determine how and to whom the money 
will be distributed, and the district court’s distribution plan will not be disturbed on appeal unless 
that discretion has been abused.” (citations omitted)).  
 117. SEC v. Lund, 570 F. Supp. 1397, 1404 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
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administrator according to the “fair and reasonable” standard.118 
Notably, disgorgement plans can be ordered regardless of the presence 
of injured investors.119 And the disgorged amount can be transferred 
directly to the U.S. Department of the Treasury in cases where it is 
“not feasible” to find the injured investors.120 Although the exact 
amount of disgorged funds paid to the Treasury is uncertain, in 2017 
the SEC transferred $1.9 billion in both disgorgement and civil 
penalties to the Treasury.121 Overall, the district court has broad equity 
power over disgorgement, determining when it can be granted, how 
much can be recouped, and to whom the ill-gotten gains will be 
returned.  
D. Forum Choice and the SEC: Federal Court or Administrative 
Action 
The SEC can pursue enforcement of the securities laws through 
two main avenues: federal court or administrative action. 
Disgorgement doctrine has been developed by the SEC principally in 
federal court, as demonstrated by the Texas Gulf Sulphur line of 
cases.122 But the SEC may also utilize administrative action to serve its 
public mission. The SEC’s power to obtain disgorgement 
administratively was granted by a litany of reform bills intended to 
prevent financial misconduct.123 Accordingly, the SEC is often 
presented with the pivotal choice of which forum is best suited for its 
needs and goals. 
 
 118. See SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991) (“With the fair and reasonable standard 
firmly in mind, we must examine the district court’s approval of the Revised Plan to see if its 
decision constituted an abuse of discretion.”). 
 119. See Fischbach, 133 F.3d at 175–76 (noting that “the primary purpose of disgorgement is 
to deter violations of the securities laws” and that “the measure of disgorgement need not be tied 
to the losses suffered by defrauded investors”). 
 120. For example, Lund noted:  
Any amount remaining in the escrow account [holding funds for the compensation of 
members of the public harmed by Lund’s conduct] after one year shall be paid into the 
United States Treasury. If the magistrate determines that it is not feasible to locate 
those members of the public who were harmed by Lund’s conduct, he may order the 
escrow funds to be paid into the United States Treasury at an earlier time. 
Lund, 570 F. Supp. at 1405; see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2017 AGENCY 
FINAL REPORT 31 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-agency-financial-report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F673-VBB3] (“Disgorgement and penalties ordered and collected from violators of the 
securities laws, some of which are then returned to harmed investors and the balances are 
transferred to the Treasury”). 
 121. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 120, at 69. 
 122. See supra notes 74–90 and accompanying text. 
 123. See id. 
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The SEC’s forum selection calculus has undergone significant 
change in recent years. Throughout most of securities enforcement 
history, the dichotomy was that “litigated cases involving registered 
entities such as broker-dealers and investment advisers were generally 
brought in administrative proceedings, while cases involving non-
industry individuals and entities were brought in federal district 
court.”124 While the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny 
Stock Reform Act of 1990 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 marked 
a new stage in the growth of the SEC administrative forum, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010125 was the high-water mark of 
the SEC’s embrace of agency adjudication. The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform Act of 2010 enables the SEC to pursue enforcement 
actions against individuals and nonregistered entities in administrative 
proceedings, and not just in federal court.126 This newfound power has 
been used frequently: “In 2014, for example, the SEC instituted more 
than 610 administrative proceedings—nearly double the number of 
administrative actions filed in 2005.”127 And this discretion is almost 
entirely the SEC’s to wield.128 
 
 124. Randall J. Fons, Administrative Proceedings vs. Federal Court: The SEC Provides 




 125. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
 126. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g)(1) (“In any cease-and-desist proceeding under subsection (a), 
the Commission may impose a civil penalty on a person . . . .”); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, 
The SEC’s Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE. J. REG. 1, 9 
(2017) (“After Dodd-Frank, the SEC no longer needs to proceed in federal court in order to 
assess civil penalties.”). 
 127. William R. Baker, III, Brian E. Kowalski, Kory S. Wilmot & Stephen P. Barry, SEC 
Enforcement Division Issues Guidance on Venue Selection, LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (2015), 
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/lw-sec-guidance-choice-of-venue [https://perma.cc.6R45-
WDGN]. 
 128. See Peter J. Henning, Choosing the Battlefield in S.E.C. Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/dealbook/choosing-the-battlefield-in-sec-
cases.html [https://perma.cc/BE3E-VGQ7] (“The S.E.C. has almost unfettered discretion to 
choose where a case will be litigated, much to the chagrin of defense lawyers who complain that 
an administrative adjudication deprives their clients of valuable rights.”). 
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Due to negative media coverage and outcry from the white-collar 
defense bar,129 the SEC published its own internal guidelines for forum 
selection in 2015.130 The publication lists four factors: 
The availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of 
relief in each forum; . . . [w]hether any charged party is a registered 
entity or an individual associated with a registered entity . . . the cost-, 
resource-, and time-effectiveness of litigation in each forum[;] . . . [and 
f]air, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and 
matters.131  
Despite SEC’s public-image conscious response, the SEC still 
possesses the power of the final forum choice.132 This choice might be 
somewhat constrained by a public perception of a “home-court 
advantage” and by constitutional challenges to the administrative 
forum, but the choice remains with the SEC. Ultimately, however, after 
Kokesh v. SEC, disgorgement remains under threat. 
III.  KOKESH V. SEC: MR. KOKESH GOES TO WASHINGTON 
As the owner of two firms, Charles Kokesh advised business 
development companies on investments.133 The SEC alleged that he 
misappropriated $34.9 million between 1995 and 2009 and that he filed 
false and misleading reports to conceal the misappropriation.134 In the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, Kokesh was found 
guilty of violating a litany of federal securities laws.135 The court 
ordered Kokesh to pay $2,354,593 as a civil monetary penalty.136 With 
respect to the civil penalty, all malfeasance committed by Kokesh prior 
to October 27, 2004, was excluded from the calculation of the total 
 
 129. See, e.g., Eaglesham, supra note 30 (noting fairness concerns over the SEC’s 
administrative proceedings from defendants, members the securities bar, and a former SEC 
judge); Henning, supra note 128 (noting that defense lawyers complain that the SEC 
administrative adjudication “deprives their clients of valuable rights”). 
 130. Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions, U.S. SECS. 
& EXCH. COMM’N (2015), https://www.millerchevalier.com/sites/default/files/resources/
FCPAReview/FCPAReviewSummer2015_SEC-Guidance_Division-of-Enforcement-Approach-
to-Forum-Selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U5H-3LTG]. 
 131. Id. at 1–4.  
 132. Fons, supra note 124 (“The guidance, however, ultimately provides the Division with 
virtually complete discretion in choosing the playing field that will be most advantageous to its 
case and to its view of the ‘proper development of the law.’”). 
 133. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. at 1642. 
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penalty because of the five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 
2462.137 Unsurprisingly, the SEC also sought disgorgement to the fullest 
measure—a total of $34.9 million that included $29.9 million for 
misconduct before October 27, 2004.138 The district court ruled that the 
five-year statute of limitations under § 2462 did not apply to the 
disgorgement amount because disgorgement is not a penalty.139 On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that disgorgement is 
neither a penalty nor a forfeiture.140 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to determine the status of disgorgement under § 2462.141  
At first glance, the Kokesh decision seems routine and limited in 
scope. The Supreme Court, in a 9–0 opinion, held that disgorgement is 
subject to the five-year statute of limitations because the SEC’s use of 
disgorgement is a penalty for the limited purposes of § 2462.142 That is, 
disgorgement is a penalty and not remedial, but only within one statute. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sotomayor relied upon the 
Huntington v. Attrill143 definition of a penalty: a “penalty” is a 
“punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by 
the State, for a crime or offense against its laws.”144 Justice Sotomayor 
also outlined two principal requirements for an action to be a 
penalty.145 First, the act must seek to redress a public wrong.146 And 
second, deterrence—not compensation—must be the principal 
purpose of the action.147  
Disgorgement easily fulfilled the two-part penalty test according 
to the Court in Kokesh. The Court reasoned that because violations of 
securities laws are public law offenses against the United States,148 the 
subsequent removal of illicit profits from wrongdoers serves to redress 
a public wrong.149 The SEC had previously conceded the first 
 
 137. Id. at 1641 (“As to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court determined that § 
2462’s 5-year limitations period precluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to 
October 27, 2004—that is, five years prior to the date the Commission filed the complaint.”). 
 138. Id. at 1640. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. at 1645. 
 143. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
 144. Id. at 667. 
 145. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id. at 1643. 
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Huntington penalty factor by acknowledging its role of acting in the 
public interest.150 According to the Court, the public nature of SEC 
disgorgement is shown in the fact that the SEC may continue an 
enforcement action without any injured individuals as parties.151  
The Court also found that SEC disgorgement meets the second 
Huntington characteristic of penal measures.152 Relying on lower-court 
interpretations, the Court characterized disgorgement primarily as a 
tool to prevent future financial misconduct.153 Despite the fact that 
victims many times do receive disgorged funds,154 the Court found it 
dispositive that district courts are not statutorily commanded to 
distribute funds to victims.155 Justice Sotomayor concluded her opinion 
by declaring that “SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a 
penalty.”156 
As with many Supreme Court decisions, the devil of Kokesh is in 
the footnotes. Footnote 3 states, in full: 
Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on 
whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC 
enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have properly applied 
disgorgement principles in this context[.] The sole question presented 
in this case is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement 
actions, is subject to § 2462’s limitations period.157 
In one footnote, the Supreme Court seemingly opened up 
Pandora’s box. As one commentator on the decision notes, “when the 
Supreme Court says, ‘We’re not expressing an opinion on x,’ you can 
be pretty sure the justices are expressing an opinion on x.”158 The New 
York Times published an article entitled Supreme Court Casts Doubts 
 
 150. Id. (remarking that the SEC embraced its public enforcement role in its briefs). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id.  
 154. See id. at 1644 (“Some disgorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are dispersed to 
the United States Treasury.” (citations omitted)). 
 155. See id. (“Even though district courts may distribute the funds to the victims, they have 
not identified any statutory command that they do so. When an individual is made to pay a 
noncompensatory sanction to the Government as a consequence of a legal violation, the payment 
operates as a penalty.”).  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 1642. 
 158. Bray, supra note 28. 
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on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon.159 A Forbes piece even went so far as to 
herald a world without disgorgement, in Chronicle of Disgorgement’s 
Death Foretold: Kokesh v. SEC.160 The Cato Institute, a libertarian 
think tank, also took notice, issuing a Shakespearean blog title: Kokesh 
v. SEC: A Penalty by Any Other Name.161 Kokesh also unleashed a 
torrent of examination pieces on law firm websites, having prompted a 
quiet cheer throughout the immensely profitable and highly active 
white-collar defense bar.162  
For the first time since 1971, disgorgement appears vulnerable.163 
The SEC has pushed disgorgement to its equitable limit, recovering 
from defendants amounts that were essentially penal—amounts that 
went beyond merely restoring the status quo. For example, the SEC 
sought disgorgement in cases where the defendants never received the 
profit of their misconduct,164 and sought the full amount where the 
defendant’s expenses reduced the illegal profit in question.165 The 
reasoning of Kokesh, despite attempts to cabin its holding, nonetheless 
opens the door for a wider decision that deems disgorgement a penalty 
as a categorical matter. If disgorgement were held categorically to be a 
penalty, it could no longer be authorized by a court in equity, and 
federal courts would need statutory authorization to grant it. Put 
simply, Footnote 3 of Kokesh resonates because it lays bare the uneasy 
 
 159. Peter J. Henning, Supreme Court Casts Doubt on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/supreme-court-casts-
doubts-on-a-potent-sec-weapon.html?mcubz=0&_r=0 [https://www.perma.cc/D969-DT3T]. 
 160. Robert Anello, Chronicle of Disgorgement’s Death Foretold: Kokesh v. SEC, FORBES 
(July 11, 2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/07/11/chronicle-of-
disgorgements-death-foretold-kokesh-v-sec/#284bfc6861b8 [https://perma.cc/H6WX-79XF].  
 161. Thaya Brook Knight & Ilya Shapiro, Kokesh v. SEC: A Penalty by Any Other Name, 
CATO INST. (June 6, 2017, 8:55 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/kokesh-v-sec-penalty-any-other-
name [https://perma.cc/AP7S-EU6S]. 
 162. See, e.g., Nicolas Bourtin, Nicole Friedlander, Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., Sharon L. Nelles, 
Kenneth M. Raisler, Karen Patton Seymour, Samuel W. Seymour, Benjamin R. Walker & 
Alexander J. Willscher, Kokesh v. SEC: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That a Five-Year Statute of 
Limitations Applies When the SEC Seeks Disgorgement in Enforcement Actions, SULLIVAN & 
CROMWELL (June 6, 2017), https://www.sullcrom.com/kokesh-v-sec-us-supreme-court-holds-
that-a-five-year-statute-of-limitations-applies-when-the-sec-seeks-disgorgement-in-
enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/9B5C-K3M9] (noting the beneficial effects of the Kokesh 
ruling for defendants). 
 163. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 164. See generally SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding an inside trader 
liable for the gains of those to whom the illicit information was given). 
 165. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017) (“SEC disgorgement sometimes is 
ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount of illegal 
profit.”). 
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doctrinal ground for disgorgement. Just as federal court disgorgement 
was granted by judicial authority, it may also be taken away by judicial 
authority.166  
IV.  DISGORGEMENT’S DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD 
As suggested by the Supreme Court in Kokesh, disgorgement has 
undoubtedly been pushed to the limits of its power by the SEC. This 
Part argues that there are three principal reasons why disgorgement is 
under threat, and thus why it should be reined in. First, recent Supreme 
Court cases repudiate unbridled governmental enforcement authority. 
Second, disgorgement has been erroneously utilized as a penalty at 
equity. And third, the original rationale for equitable disgorgement—
filling a crucial gap in the SEC enforcement arsenal—does not have the 
same force in the present day. By limiting its use of disgorgement, the 
SEC can save disgorgement in federal court. Equitable disgorgement 
should be saved for a number of reasons, including the uncertain future 
of disgorgement in administrative proceedings, the intuitive notion 
that wrongdoers should not profit from their wrongs, and the need to 
compensate defrauded investors.  
A. Why Disgorgement Should Be Reined In 
1. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Trends Against Expansive 
Enforcement Power.  Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has moved 
toward rejecting the type of unchecked governmental power that the 
expansive use of disgorgement represents. This judicial trend is best 
seen through the lens of cases like Kokesh,167 Gabelli v. SEC,168 and 
Honeycutt v. United States.169 In each of these cases, and in others, the 
Court has curbed the government’s ability to exercise its enforcement 
power seemingly without any meaningful limit. Taken together, these 
cases serve as a warning for the SEC that if it continues to push the 
limits of disgorgement, it may suffer the most significant setback of its 
enforcement powers to date—the complete loss of equitable 
disgorgement. 
 
 166. See generally e.g., Francesco A. DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution’s Dagger Under the 
Securities Acts: Why Federal Courts are Powerless to Order Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement 
Proceedings, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 899 (2014) (arguing that disgorgement is not truly an 
equitable remedy and thus should not be granted by the court). 
 167. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635. 
 168. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442 (2013). 
 169. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626 (2017). 
BUTLER IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2018  12:39 PM 
356  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68:333 
Kokesh itself demonstrates the Supreme Court’s reluctance to 
continue endorsing the unchecked enforcement power held by the 
SEC. Specifically, the Court’s holding that disgorgement is subject to a 
five-year statute of limitations170 offers a procedural restraint that had 
not bound the SEC before. No longer can the government reach deep 
into the past to disgorge amounts from securities violations committed 
long ago. For the SEC, this limitation was significant; in the Kokesh 
case, it meant the difference between receiving a non-time-barred 
recovery amount of $39.9 million or the five-year statutorily limited 
amount of $5 million.171 Accordingly, Kokesh marks an instance in 
which the Court provided a meaningful limit on SEC enforcement 
power by holding the Commission to a procedural restraint. 
Gabelli is another case in which the Supreme Court circumscribed 
the enforcement power of the SEC by holding that the five-year statute 
of limitations for civil penalties under § 2462 begins when the fraud 
occurs, not when the SEC discovers it.172 The SEC had sought to have 
the five-year statute of limitations for civil monetary penalties begin 
when the Commission discovers the wrongdoing,173 which would 
strengthen the SEC’s already significant enforcement abilities. For 
example, if the Court had ruled that the statute of limitations 
commences upon the discovery of fraud, the SEC could prosecute a 
violation from the 1990s—or perhaps even further back—if it only 
found out about the fraud in the present day. The Court rejected this 
interpretation and noted that the SEC has several potent tools at its 
disposal to promptly uncover wrongdoing, including demands for 
detailed trading information,174 compelled disclosure of trading 
books,175 subpoena power,176 authorization to pay whistleblowers,177 
and ability to offer “cooperation agreements” to alleged wrongdoers.178 
 
 170. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1646. 
 171. Id. at 1641. 
 172. Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 454. 
 173. Id. at 449. 
 174. See id. at 451 (“It can demand that securities brokers and dealers submit detailed trading 
information.”). 
 175. See id. (“It can require investment advisers to turn over their comprehensive books and 
records at any time.”). 
 176. See id. (“And even without filing suit, it can subpoena any documents and witnesses it 
deems relevant or material to an investigation.”). 
 177. See id. (“The SEC is also authorized to pay monetary awards to whistleblowers, who 
provide information relating to violations of the securities laws.”). 
 178. See id. (“In addition, the SEC may offer ‘cooperation agreements’ to violators to procure 
information about others in exchange for more lenient treatment.”). 
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In fact, the Court declared that “the SEC as enforcer is a far cry from 
the defrauded victim the discovery rule evolved to protect.”179 The 
Court’s ruling demonstrated that allowing the SEC to enjoy the 
benefits of the statute of limitations discovery rule would be a step too 
far in terms of permitting unbridled enforcement authority. 
Although it did not involve securities fraud, Honeycutt also serves 
as an example of the Supreme Court reining in unbridled government 
enforcement power.180 In Honeycutt, the Court held that joint and 
several liability does not apply to the criminal asset forfeiture statute, 
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1).181 Tony Honeycutt pled guilty to several federal 
drug crimes for distributing iodine—a product used in 
methamphetamine production—through the hardware store he 
owned.182 As part of his guilty plea, Tony was ordered to pay $200,000 
of the $269,751.98 he had received in illicit profits.183 Terry Honeycutt, 
Tony’s brother, was indicted as a co-conspirator, and the Government 
sought to use the Criminal Asset Forfeiture Act of 1984 to recoup the 
remaining $69,751.98 of profit from Terry.184 This Act allows the 
government to pursue “any property constituting, or derived from, any 
proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of” 
the crimes in question.185 The government used a theory of joint and 
several liability to force Terry—who had been indicted as a co-
conspirator but who notably neither owned the store nor saw any of 
Tony’s profits—to pay the remaining illicit profits.186  
 
 179. Id.  
 180. See Dixie L. Johnson, Carmen Lawrence, M. Alexander Koch, Matthew H. Baughman 
and Abraham N.M. Shashy, Jr., King & Spalding Discusses Potential Effects of  
SEC Disgorgement As a Penalty, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21,  
2017) http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/06/21/king-spalding-discusses-potential-effects-of-
sec-disgorgement-as-penalty/#_edn25 [https://perma.cc/YWH2-MZWR] (arguing that Kokesh 
and Honeycutt “signal a clear desire by the Court to rein in the government’s more aggressive 
theories of monetary remedies”). 
 181. Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1628 (2017).  
 182. Id.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Id.  
 185. Section 853(a)(1)–(2) provides: 
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, 
irrespective of any provision of State law—(1) any property constituting, or derived 
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such 
violation; (2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner 
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation . . . . 
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1) (2012). 
 186. Honeycutt, 137 S. Ct. at 1628. 
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Rejecting the application of joint and several liability in this 
instance, the Court held that permissible forfeitures are limited to what 
the defendant himself acquired as a result of his crime, not what his co-
conspirator acquired.187 In simple terms, Terry Honeycutt was not 
responsible for forfeiting profits that his brother Tony made because 
Terry had “no ownership interest in his brother’s store and did not 
personally benefit from the illegal sales.”188 Honeycutt held that the 
text of the statute limits forfeiture to tainted property that a defendant 
personally procured,189 noting that joint liability runs counter to other 
forfeiture statutes and is not reflected in congressional intent.190 
Honeycutt is troubling for the SEC’s use of disgorgement because 
it demonstrates that the Court’s recent limits on discretionary 
governmental power have been extended beyond the securities 
enforcement context. The drug crime context of Honeycutt illustrates 
a much broader Supreme Court repudiation of the government using 
its power without any meaningful limit. Specifically, the Court stated 
that forcing Terry Honeycutt to forfeit profits that his brother Tony 
made would constitute an “end run” of the Criminal Asset Forfeiture 
Statute.191 According to Honeycutt, Congress explicitly “contemplated 
situations where the tainted property itself would fall outside the 
Government’s reach.”192 Therefore, in attempting to hold Terry 
Honeycutt liable for gains he never received, the Government was 
exercising its power beyond its statutory bounds. The Court rejected 
the Government’s attempt to “circumvent Congress’ carefully 
constructed statutory scheme . . . .”193 The Honeycutt decision marks a 
concerted effort by the Court to tame excessive governmental power, 
demonstrating that the force of its disapproval of expansive 
enforcement power is not limited to the realm of securities. 
2. SEC Use of Disgorgement as a Penalty Violates Notions of 
Equity.  Disgorgement should also be reined in because the SEC has 
violated the principles of equity by using disgorgement punitively. 
Kokesh defines disgorgement as a type of “restitution measured by the 
 
 187. Id.  
 188. Id. at 1628–29.  
 189. Id. at 1633. 
 190. Id. at 1633–34. 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id.  
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defendant’s wrongful gain.”194 The Supreme Court, however, noted 
several instances where the amount recovered by the SEC “exceed[ed] 
the profits gained as a result of the violation.”195 In these cases, 
disgorgement transforms from a remedial measure into a punitive 
sanction. First, to demonstrate overzealous disgorgement in insider 
trading cases, Kokesh disapprovingly cited SEC v. Contorinis196 that 
SEC had been able to recover third-party profits from an insider trader 
who never actually received such profits.197 Next, the Court made an 
example of SEC v. Warde,198 wherein the SEC received disgorgement 
from a tipper (the person who illegally released confidential 
information that affects stock price), even though the disgorged gains 
had been the tippees’ (the people who received the confidential 
information).199 Both examples show that the SEC has used 
disgorgement to penalize the wrongdoer for misconduct, as the 
amounts recovered exceeded the restoration of the status quo and were 
not limited to solely the amount gained by the wrongdoer. In using 
disgorgement punitively, the SEC has been contravening basic equity 
principles, as “there are no penalties at equity.”200 
3. The Original Rationale for Disgorgement Is No Longer As 
Persuasive.  Disgorgement should also be narrowed because the SEC’s 
enforcement power has expanded significantly since Texas Gulf 
Sulphur. When first instituted, disgorgement fulfilled a reasonable 
need: “to effectuate the purposes of the [Securities Exchange] Act [of 
1934].”201 Previously, the SEC had the limited remedy of an injunction 
at its disposal in order to deter wrongdoing,202 as well as other, less 
potent ancillary equitable remedies.203 Disgorgement thus served a 
unique purpose at the time as the only remedy in the SEC arsenal that 
allowed the Commission to recoup profits from wrongdoers.204  
 
 194. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
 195. Id. at 1644. 
 196. SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 197. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644. 
 198. SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 199. Id. at 47. 
 200. Bray, supra note 28.  
 201. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 202. See supra Part III.A. 
 203. See supra Part II.B. 
 204. See supra Part I. 
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Since the advent of disgorgement, the SEC has only increased in 
power. It has notably received a number of other enforcement tools 
that enable it to fully enforce the antifraud provisions of the securities 
laws. For example, the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny 
Stock Reform Act of 1990 allowed for the imposition of civil monetary 
penalties—calculated according to the gross pecuniary gain of the 
wrongdoing205—in federal court for violations of federal securities 
laws.206 The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act of 1990 also gave expansive power to the SEC’s 
Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”), and thus “created the modern 
regime of administrative proceedings.”207 These ALJs were not only 
given cease-and-desist authority,208 but also the ability to 
administratively order disgorgement with the same effect and 
requirements as federal courts.209 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 expanded the SEC’s powers even 
further, giving the Commission the statutorily authorized ability to 
compensate injured investors with the money received through civil 
penalties or disgorgement via a “Fair Fund.”210 And most recently, the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 enabled the SEC to 
administratively impose civil penalties outside of federal court.211 In 
administrative proceedings, civil monetary penalties are not imposed 
according to the defendant’s gain, as in disgorgement, but instead are 
calculated according to “each act or omission” in violation of the  
Securities Acts,212 with three tiers of penalty amounts increasing in 
severity.213  
 
 205. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
 206. See, e.g., id. § 78ff(c)(1)(B) (“Any issuer that violates subsection (a) or (g) of section 
78dd–1 of this title shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 imposed in an action 
brought by the Commission.”). 
 207. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV., 1155, 1164 (2016). 
 208. Section 77h-1(a) provides: 
If the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that any person is 
violating, has violated, or is about to violate any provision of this subchapter, or any 
rule or regulation thereunder, the Commission may publish its findings and enter an 
order requiring such person, and any other person that is, was, or would be a cause of 
the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should have known would 
contribute to such violation, to cease and desist from committing or causing such 
violation and any future violation of the same provision, rule, or regulation. 
15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a). 
 209. Id. § 78u-2(e). 
 210. Id. § 7246. 
 211. Id. § 929(a). 
 212. Id. § 78u-2(b)(1). 
 213. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(g), 78u-2(b), 80a-9(d), 80b-3(i). 
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At the time of Texas Gulf Sulphur, disgorgement as an equitable 
remedy was necessary because it was the only way for the SEC to 
recover illicit profits from wrongdoers and to fully enforce federal 
securities laws.214 But since then, the arrival of a “panoply of 
enforcement tools”215 has significantly lessened—but not necessarily 
eliminated—the SEC’s need for disgorgement in federal court.  
B. Reasons To Keep Disgorgement as an Enforcement Tool 
The persuasive case for limiting the SEC’s excessive use of 
disgorgement in federal court does not mean that disgorgement should 
be abandoned entirely. Rather, there are three compelling reasons that 
disgorgement as an equitable remedy should remain a powerful tool in 
the SEC’s enforcement array. First, the SEC cannot move all of its 
disgorgement actions to administrative proceedings because the future 
of ALJs remains in doubt. Second, disgorgement satisfies intuitive 
notions of justice by ensuring that ill-gotten gains are returned and 
greed is not rewarded. And third, disgorgement by the SEC serves a 
vital need—compensation for defrauded investors. 
On its face, moving disgorgement to administrative proceedings is 
a feasible response to the threat Kokesh poses for disgorgement in 
federal court. After all, as former SEC enforcement director Andrew 
Ceresney has noted, the SEC may “obtain many—though not all—of 
the same remedies in administrative proceedings as [it] could get in 
district court.”216 It would also track well with the larger trend of the 
SEC’s embrace of the administrative proceeding: “Before 2010, the 
agency initiated less than 400 administrative claims per year; after 2010, 
it initiated substantially more than 400; in 2014, it brought 610, a 
record.”217 And the SEC is resoundingly successful when it brings 
administrative actions; the SEC has a success rate of 90 percent in front 
of ALJs as opposed to 69 percent in federal court.218  
However, ALJs—the very actors who would administratively 
order disgorgement—are on shaky footing as well. In Lucia v. SEC, the 
Supreme Court recently invalidated civil-service appointment of 
 
 214. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1640 (2017). 
 215. Id. (noting that before Texas Gulf Sulphur there was an “absence of statutory 
authorization for monetary remedies”). 
 216. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enf’t, Remarks to the American 
Bar Association’s Business Law Section Fall Meeting (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543515297 [https://perma.cc/JES7-P95V]. 
 217. Zaring, supra note 207, at 1174. 
 218. Eaglesham, supra note 30. 
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ALJs.219 Because the ALJs were appointed by the civil-service staff and 
not by the Commission itself, and because the ALJs are officers of the 
United States and not merely employees of the SEC, the Court ruled 
that such appointments violate the Appointments Clause.220  
Although the SEC recently moved to ratify its ALJs in accordance 
with the Appointments Clause ruling in Lucia,221 a significant question 
looms regarding the circumstances enabling the removal of ALJs.222 
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, addressed this “embedded constitutional 
question” of “the statutory ‘for cause’ removal protections that 
Congress provided for administrative law judges.”223 Breyer, in doing 
so, draws upon another recent case, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board, which struck down multilevel 
protections for members of the Board.224 Specifically, Breyer focused 
on an important ramification of the Lucia decision for the 
administrative state as a whole: “If the Free Enterprise Fund Court’s 
holding applies equally to the administrative law judges—and I stress 
the ‘if’—then to hold that the administrative law judges are ‘Officers of 
 
 219. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (holding that SEC ALJs are “[o]fficers of the 
United States” and must therefore be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause of 
the Constitution). 
 220. See id. at 2052–55 (concluding on the basis of the test set out in Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 
U.S. 868 (1991), that the ALJs are not employees but “officers” for the purposes of the 
Appointments Clause). The Appointments Clause states: 
[A]nd [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are 
not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 221. Order, Securities Act Release No. 10440, Exchange Act Release No. 82,178, Investment 
Advisors Act Release No. 4816, Investment Company Act Release No. 32,929, 2017 WL 5969234 
(Nov. 30, 2017); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Ratifies Appointment 
of Admin. Law Judges (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-215 
[https://perma.cc/SET4-SWSN]. 
 222. This constitutional challenge of the ALJ regime has been discussed on SCOTUSblog:  
That gets us to the second and more significant question that this decision has 
produced: Can the extensive statutory protections against ALJ removal except for 
good cause, which must be determined by the independent Merit System Protection 
Board, survive, or will the court follow through on what it started in 2010 in Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and strike down these 
limits on removal? 
Alan Morrison, Symposium: Lucia v. SEC – more questions than answers, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
22, 2018 8:57 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-lucia-v-sec-more-questions-
than-answers [https://perma.cc/EV5A-57NG]. 
 223. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2057 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 224. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 514 (2010). 
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the United States’ is, perhaps, to hold that their removal protections 
are unconstitutional.”225 Accordingly, given the recent doctrinal 
upheaval as a result of Lucia, heavily leaning on an imperiled remedy 
(disgorgement) in an unstable forum (administrative proceedings) only 
compounds the risk that the SEC will lose valuable enforcement 
options.  
Further, disgorgement should be saved because it is an intuitive 
tool for the SEC, and perhaps more importantly, it is fundamentally 
compatible with the larger purpose of the Securities Acts. The 
reasonableness of the principle that wrongdoers should not stand to 
profit from their ill-gotten gains is evidenced by the similarity of 
disgorgement to another well-established equitable remedy—
restitution. Disgorgement and restitution share many of the same 
concepts in the securities enforcement context, operating as equitable 
remedies that take funds away from the wrongdoer.226 The SEC defines 
restitution as “the repayment by a defendant of funds, or their 
equivalent, to an injured person.”227 Moreover, in SEC enforcement 
actions, “[r]estitution is intended to make investors whole.”228 In effect, 
limiting disgorgement so that it only compensates investors makes the 
relief function as restitution. The key difference between the two is one 
of rationale; the purpose of restitution is to make investors whole, 
while the purpose of disgorgement is to return the wrongdoer to his or 
her status quo from before the misconduct. For all the reasons that 
restitution has historically been embraced, disgorgement should also 
remain a viable equitable remedy.  
The justification for disgorgement—that wrongdoers should be 
ordered to return ill-gotten gains to restore the status quo—also 
underlies other SEC enforcement measures. For example, a clawback 
provision in section 304(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 enables 
the SEC to recover a certain amount of executive officer compensation 
when the company restates its financials out of “material non-
compliance” resulting from financial misconduct.229 A proposed 
 
 225. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2060 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 226. See 2006 SEC SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 107, at 2–3 (“Disgorgement is a well-
established, equitable remedy applied by federal district courts and is designed to deprive 
defendants of ‘ill-gotten gains.’”). 
 227. Id. at 3 n.2. 
 228. Id.  
 229. See 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2012) (“If an issuer is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any 
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addition to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 contains 
a provision that would expand the use of clawbacks.230 Ultimately, the 
general orienting principle of disgorgement is validated by the fact that 
the same principle also supports restitution and other SEC 
enforcement measures. Disgorgement is not an isolated enforcement 
doctrine, but rather an embodiment of the familiar notion that 
wrongdoers should not profit from their gains. 
Disgorgement is also necessary because it fulfills an essential 
role—compensating defrauded investors when they otherwise would 
not be. In her study, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence 
from the SEC’s Fair Fund Distributions, scholar Urska Velikonja 
declares that “[t]he rise of public compensation, such as the SEC’s 
distribution funds, fills a void in securities laws that leaves many victims 
with no private remedy.”231 Although some critique SEC enforcement 
actions as duplicative of private litigation like securities class actions,232 
Velikonja’s study reveals the opposite: “Successful class actions 
accompany 46.3% of fair funds distributions overall and 28.1% of 
distributions in cases not associated with issuer reporting and disclosure 
violations.”233 Because the majority of cases are not accompanied by 
successful class actions,  “the SEC’s fair fund distribution is often the 
only source of compensation for defrauded investors.”234 Between 2002 
and 2012, the SEC created 243 fair funds through the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, and those funds distributed $14.46 billion in civil monetary 
 
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief 
financial officer of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer.”). 
 230. A law firm client release explains how this amended clawback provision would operate: 
Under Dodd-Frank, the policy would apply in the event the company had to prepare 
an accounting restatement due to the company’s material noncompliance with any 
financial reporting requirement under the securities laws. The policy must provide that 
the company will recover from any current or former executive officer an amount of 
incentive-based compensation (including options awarded as compensation) equal to 
the excess, if any, of the amount that was paid to the executive officer, in the three years 
preceding the date on which the company was required to prepare the restatement, 
over the amount that would have been paid to the executive officer based on the 
accurate financial data. 
Cydney Posner, SEC Proposes Clawback Rules, COOLEY (July 1, 2015), 
https://cooleypubco.com/2015/07/01/sec-proposes-clawback-rules [https://perma.cc/TMD2-
CNMC]. 
 231. Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence From the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 331 (2015). 
 232. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on 
the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 139–40 (2011) (arguing that securities class actions and SEC 
enforcement actions achieve the same goal). 
 233. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 391. 
 234. Id.  
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penalties and disgorgement to defrauded investors.235 Moreover, 
between 2004 and 2012, an estimated 75 percent of the amount the SEC 
received from enforcement actions was distributed through fair funds 
to defrauded investors.236 These numbers represent a shockingly 
successful compensation scheme, especially considering that 
“traditional compensation schemes, in particular private litigation, fail 
to compensate victims for large classes of harms.”237  
V.  SAVING DISGORGEMENT FROM ITSELF 
While equitable disgorgement is under threat as currently 
implemented, it can still be saved if the SEC tailors its use in two 
primary ways. First, the SEC should limit disgorgement to amounts 
that restore the pre-wrongdoing status quo, instead of pursuing 
disgorgement beyond the amount the wrongdoer gained. Second, the 
SEC should distribute the funds obtained through disgorgement not to 
the U.S. Treasury or its own coffers, but rather to defrauded investors 
as much-needed compensation. By adopting both of these self-imposed 
reform measures, the SEC can ensure the continued vitality of 
disgorgement in light of Kokesh and other threats. 
Limiting the use of disgorgement to the profit the defendant 
actually received is the first step in preserving disgorgement as a useful 
SEC enforcement measure.238 The SEC should only request 
disgorgement from the district court in cases where the “ill-gotten gains 
remain extant and identifiable,”239 providing “a specific pool of money 
that can be turned over to the SEC.”240 In these instances, there is a 
concrete measure of the defendant’s wrongful gain, and disgorging that 
amount would restore the pre-wrongdoing status quo.  
To effectuate this new direction, the SEC should prevent the 
dissipation of ill-gotten funds, using methods such as a “temporary 
restraining order, a preliminary asset freeze, the appointment of a 
 
 235. Id. at 333. 
 236. Id. at 334 n.12. 
 237. Id. at 338. 
 238. See Johnson et al., supra note 180 (noting that “the Commission could define 
disgorgement more narrowly as restitution to the victims of the illegal conduct, in keeping with 
the original holding of Texas Gulf Sulphur and therefore more in line with the traditional 
equitable powers of federal courts”); see also discussion supra Part IV.B. (regarding the difference 
between restitution and disgorgement).   
 239. Ryan, supra note 69, at 11. 
 240. Id.  
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receiver, [or] a voluntary agreement.”241 This would be a simple rule 
for the SEC to follow, but it would nonetheless significantly curtail the 
SEC’s enforcement power.242 As stated previously, the SEC does have 
a bevy of other enforcement tools—for example, civil monetary 
penalties and criminal sanctions—to mitigate this reduction in 
authority.243 Although curtailing the expansive scope of its 
disgorgement power could frustrate the SEC’s remediation of certain 
complex frauds, that is better than the alternative of losing 
disgorgement altogether. 
In restraining disgorgement so that it only restores the status quo 
that existed prior to the wrongdoing, the SEC would thus avoid a 
central rationale of the Kokesh Court’s penalty reasoning—that the 
SEC’s use of disgorgement “sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a 
result of the violation.”244 Thus, disgorgement would be used solely as 
a remedial measure, and not a punitive one. As stated previously, there 
are numerous instances in which the SEC has recouped more from the 
wrongdoer than the profits he or she actually received; recall the 
insider trader forced to pay for the benefit gained by third parties in 
Contorinis,245 the tipper ordered to give up profits obtained by the 
tippees in Warde,246 and the wrongdoer-incurred expenses that were 
not deducted from disgorged ill-gotten gains as in Kokesh.247 In these 
cases, the SEC pressed disgorgement as far as it could, but it is evident 
that the Supreme Court considers such tactics to be penalties, not 
remedial measures. To prevent disgorgement from fulfilling a 
 
 241. Id.  
 242. See id. (“[T]hese cases [where ill-gotten gains are extant and identifiable], based on the 
author’s two decades of anecdotal experience on both sides of SEC enforcement cases, represent 
a small fraction of SEC disgorgement cases.”). 
 243. See supra Part IV.A.4. 
 244. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017). 
 245. See SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A]n insider trader may be 
ordered to disgorge not only the unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer directly, but also 
the benefit that accrues to third parties whose gains can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s 
conduct.”). But see supra note 197 and accompanying text (noting that Kokesh cites Contorinis 
disapprovingly to warn against overzealous disgorgement). 
 246. See SEC v. Warde, 151 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven if the [tippee’s] profits were 
fairly characterized as third party profits, Warde would nevertheless be liable to disgorge their 
profits. A tippee’s gains are attributable to the tipper, regardless whether benefit accrues to the 
tipper.”). But see supra notes 198–99 and accompanying text (noting that Kokesh cites Warde 
disapprovingly). 
 247. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644 (“As demonstrated by this case, SEC disgorgement 
sometimes is ordered without consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount 
of illegal profit.”). 
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significant part of the Kokesh penalty rationale, the SEC should limit 
its requests to the amount of profits actually gained as a result of the 
wrongdoer’s violation. That is, disgorgement should be used only to 
restore the status quo. 
The SEC should also reorient its use of disgorgement so that it is 
solely a compensatory measure for defrauded investors. In fact, the 
SEC already employs its enforcement powers to receive compensation 
for affected victims of securities fraud through the Fair Funds provision 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Section 308 of that Act “gives the 
SEC a more prominent role in compensating defrauded investors.”248 
This section states: 
If in any judicial or administrative action . . . the Commission obtains 
a civil penalty against any person for a violation of such laws, or such 
person agrees, in settlement of any such action, to such civil penalty, 
the amount of such civil penalty shall, on the motion or at the 
direction of the Commission, be added to and become part of a 
disgorgement fund . . . for the benefit of the victims of such 
violation.249 
The establishment of fair funds to compensate defrauded investors 
shows that the SEC already has a mechanism for funneling 
disgorgement proceeds directly to victims.250 The SEC’s self-imposed 
dedication of disgorgement proceeds to victim compensation alone 
would thus not require a new statutory framework, but a renewed 
commitment to an existing one. Moreover, these fair funds are 
effective. Between 2002 and 2012, the SEC created 243 fair funds that 
distributed $14.46 billion in civil monetary penalties and disgorgement 
amounts to defrauded investors.251 Rather than treating section 308 fair 
funds victim compensation as optional, the SEC should treat it as a 
mandate that limits the Commission to seeking disgorgement only in 
instances where defrauded investors can be compensated.  
The SEC’s use of disgorgement solely as a compensatory measure 
would thereby ensure that the tool does not fulfill the second prong of 
the Kokesh penalty reasoning—a use to deter rather than to 
 
 248. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. 
LAW. 317, 318 (2008). 
 249. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012) (quoted in Black, supra note 248, at 326). 
 250. See Black, supra note 248, at 326 (“[T]he statute confers upon the SEC the authority to 
include the civil penalty, along with the disgorgement amount, in a Fair Fund for distribution to 
the victims of the violation.”).  
 251. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 333. 
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remediate.252 Specifically, Kokesh held that pecuniary measures 
become penal when requested “for the purpose of punishment, and to 
deter others from offending in like manner.”253 As identified in Kokesh, 
many previous cases expressly treated disgorgement as a deterrent 
measure. For example, Kokesh cited SEC v. Fischbach254 for the 
proposition that the “primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to 
deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-
gotten gains.”255 In addition, the Court quoted SEC v. Rind256: “The 
deterrent effect of [an SEC] enforcement action would be greatly 
undermined if securities law violators were not required to disgorge 
illicit profits.”257 However, it is evident that deterrence is simply not a 
permissible justification for disgorgement after Kokesh because 
“[s]anctions imposed for the purpose of deterring infractions of public 
laws are inherently punitive.”258 By seeking disgorgement for the 
express purpose of compensating defrauded victims, the SEC could 
transform the tool from a penal sanction to an entirely remedial action. 
In that sense, SEC disgorgement would no longer be a deterrent under 
the Kokesh penalty test, helping to prevent the complete loss of 
disgorgement. 
Although the SEC’s self-restraint in crafting disgorgement policy 
could save the tool, this strategy certainly has drawbacks. Some posit 
that the SEC should not become “a collection agency for defrauded 
investors” because “effective enforcement policy is not necessarily 
compatible with a dominant emphasis on recovering and returning 
funds to investors.”259 A potential concern of such a preemptive 
narrowing of the SEC disgorgement power may be that it allows 
defendants to retain ill-gotten gains in cases where no defrauded 
investors can be identified. At the larger doctrinal level, the concern 
over whether the SEC should serve as a collection vehicle for 
defrauded investors is mitigated by the fact that its ability to 
compensate serves a vital purpose: “More often than not, the SEC 
 
 252. See Johnson et al., supra note 180 (suggesting that “[r]enaming the remedy to clarify that 
it is different from the ‘SEC disgorgement’ analyzed by the Court, and removing it from 
deterrence rhetoric, could help clarify that [disgorgement] is remedial, not a penalty.”). 
 253. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017). 
 254. SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 255. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 175).  
 256. SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 257. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting Rind, 991 F.2d at 1491). 
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compensates harmed investors for losses where a private lawsuit is 
either unavailable or impractical.”260 For those who worry that some 
wrongdoers will go unscathed in cases where their victims go 
unidentified, the SEC—irrespective of disgorgement—still possesses 
the ability to “ask federal courts, when imposing statutory penalties 
against a defendant, to calculate that penalty as an amount equal to the 
‘gross amount of pecuniary gain to [the] defendant as a result of the 
violation.’”261  
However, the existence of civil monetary penalties calculated 
according to the amount of ill-gotten gains raises another question: 
Why does the SEC not just use statutorily enacted civil monetary 
penalties to recover these illicit profits? The answer is simple: It is 
easier for the SEC to collect disgorgement proceeds than civil penalty 
proceeds because penalties are subject to the Federal Debt Collection 
Procedures Act (“FDCPA”),262 which erects significant procedural 
hurdles for the SEC to overcome when seeking to collect defendant 
profits.263 In contrast, both administrative and court-ordered 
disgorgement, as the direct result of district court orders, are subject to 
only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.264 This makes disgorgement 
proceeds easier to obtain because the SEC can seek collection through 
a number of options, most significantly through civil contempt 
proceedings, which are prohibited under the FDCPA.265 In spite of 
these counterarguments, restraining the use of disgorgement to the 
 
 260. Velikonja, supra note 231, at 336. 
 261. Ryan, supra note 69, at 13 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B) (2012)). 
 262. Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308 (2012). 
 263. The SEC recognizes that the FDCPA limits its ability to collect penalties: 
To collect penalties, the Commission is limited to the remedies provided by the Federal 
Debt Collection Procedures Act (“FDCPA”) to pursue judgments for penalties. These 
include: execution on real property and personalty; writs of garnishment; installment 
payment orders; and, in certain circumstances, fraudulent transfer actions, which can 
be initiated against debtors who transfer their assets, thereby keeping them out of the 
creditor’s reach.  
2006 SEC SECTION 308(C) REPORT, supra note 107, at 26 (citations omitted). 
 264. See id. at 25–26 (noting that “[t]he FDCPA cannot be used to seek recovery of 
disgorgement debt” and listing ways that a court could enforce disgorgement under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 265. The SEC has a few options to pursue judgments for disgorgement: 
First, the Commission can request the federal court to hold a defendant in civil 
contempt for failure to pay the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 70. The Commission 
can also request the federal courts to issue “writs of execution” allowing it to “execute 
on” real or personal property. An execution is the physical seizure or forced sale of a 
defendant’s real or personal property. Finally, the Commission can utilize its 
administrative wage garnishment process. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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compensation of defrauded investors remains both a sensible and 
easily applied course of action for the SEC. 
CONCLUSION 
Disgorgement, since its inception in Texas Gulf Sulphur, has 
undergone perhaps the most extensive doctrinal transformation of any 
remedy sought by the SEC. As a form of ancillary equitable relief, 
disgorgement was originally intended to supplement the principal 
statutory remedy of an injunction. Instead, “[d]isgorgement has 
become the routine remedy for a securities enforcement action.”266 The 
lack of a statutory basis for disgorgement became a flashpoint after the 
Kokesh decision ruled it a penalty for statute of limitations purposes. 
The Court’s reasoning could easily be applied to disgorgement at large, 
putting the mechanism at existential risk. Disgorgement, as currently 
implemented, has been extended to the edge of its power by the SEC, 
and has often superseded its equitable mandate by recouping amounts 
that exceed the ill-gotten gains of wrongdoers.  
Accordingly, the potent tool of disgorgement remains at risk of 
being removed entirely from the enforcement arsenal. With its fault 
lines exposed after Kokesh, disgorgement should be reined in for a 
number of reasons—recent Supreme Court decisions trend toward 
repudiating such unbridled governmental power, the SEC has 
inequitably enforced disgorgement as a penalty, and the original 
rationale for disgorgement is not nearly as persuasive as it once was. 
Threatened by the loss of its most favored tool, the SEC should narrow 
its use of disgorgement to recovery of nothing more than the amount 
illicitly gained by the wrongdoer, and the SEC should use the disgorged 
funds to compensate fraud victims. Both of these measures would allow 
for disgorgement to return to its remedial—not deterrent—origins, 
thus ensuring that the SEC’s use of the enforcement tool avoids the 
penalty reasoning of Kokesh. However persuasive the argument 
against disgorgement may be, the tool is nonetheless necessary in 
federal court because the future of the remedy is uncertain in 
administrative proceedings, because it embodies the intuitive notion of 
preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongs, and because 
it fulfills the need for victim compensation. Ultimately, ensuring 
disgorgement’s future as an equitable remedy in federal court means 
saving disgorgement from itself.  
 
 266. SEC v. Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010). 
